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1From the old to the new system
The establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) that aims to enhance the 
European Union’s (EU) foreign policy institutional 
architecture has, among other things, implications 
for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Prior 
to the Service’s creation, a Deputy Director General 
of the Commission’s Directorate General (DG) 
Relex (external relations) hosted three Directorates 
dealing with the neighborhoods: 1) Directorate E 
was responsible for Eastern Europe, the Southern 
Caucasus and Central Asia which included the 
eastern dimension of the ENP; 2) Directorate F 
consisted of the units dealing with the Middle 
East and the Southern Mediterranean, which 
encompassed the Southern Neighborhood; and 3) 
Directorate D included two ENP units working on 
the horizontal issues (process and sectoral aspects) 
covering both neighborhoods.
In the post-Lisbon Treaty institutional structure, the 
Commission’s DG Relex including the Directorates 
dealing with the neighborhood became part of the 
newly established EEAS. The organization of the 
EEAS is based on the so-called Managing Directors 
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2(MD), which are equivalent to the Deputy Director 
Generals in the Commission system. The EEAS 
currently has two Managing Directors dealing with 
the neighborhoods – 1) the Europe and Central Asia 
MD (III) that also focuses the Eastern Neighborhood, 
and 2) the North Africa, Middle East, Arabian 
Peninsula, Iran and Iraq MD (IV) that deals, inter 
alia, with the Southern Neighborhood. 
In the first year and a half of the EEAS’ existence, 
the horizontal units that formed the ENP Directorate 
within the Commission’s DG Relex were attached 
to the EEAS’ Managing Directorates working on 
both the Eastern and Southern Neighborhoods. For 
administrative reasons, the ENP unit dealing with 
the philosophy of the neighborhood policy and the 
money backing up the policy was attached to the 
MD IV. The ENP unit that dealt with regulatory 
affairs was attached to the MD III.
Since its establishment, the EEAS has faced 
budgetary constraints and the pressure to rationalize, 
inter alia, resulted in a merger of two ENP units. 
As the units complemented each other, the 
rationalization made sense. However, the merger was 
also accompanied with cuts in personnel. Currently, 
the ENP unit has eighteen staff members, seven 
persons less than its predecessors. Moreover, the 
Director’s post was scrubbed and the current head 
of the ENP unit has to ‘serve two masters’, viz. the 
Managing Director III and the Managing Director 
IV. An important layer to report to is therefore 
missing and the unit has to maneuver between two 
Managing Directors with often diverging interests 
and opposing preferences, whereas in the ‘older 
system’ the ENP units had to deal with one Director. 
The policy to slim down the personnel working 
on the ENP contradicts the priorities outlined in the 
Athens Speech of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/
VP) and any further cuts could severely undermine 
the work in the area of the neighborhood policy. 
(Ashton, 2010) Moreover, prioritizing the ENP was 
reinforced by the joint Communication of the HR/
VP and the Commission of March 2011 with the 
paradigm shift towards the Southern Mediterranean. 
(European Commission and High Representative of 
the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, 2011) 
If the HR/VP is serious about the ENP being 
a priority of the EU’s external action, then the 
resources within the EEAS working on this policy 
area should be kept at a sufficient level.
The EEAS’ only unit dealing with both 
neighborhoods, and thus guarding the unity of 
the ENP, focuses on three horizontal issues: the 
philosophy of the neighborhood policy; the 
regulatory affairs; and the money for backing the 
policy. On the ENP philosophy, the EEAS works 
with the Commission taking into consideration the 
preferences of the member states. On the regulatory 
issues, the EEAS cooperates closely with the 
Commission. In matters pertaining to the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
which supports the ENP, the EEAS works with the 
member states, the European Parliament and the 
Commission.
The concrete output in the ENP philosophy is the 
so-called annual package that includes the ENP 
Communication, two regional reports and eleven 
country reports. Drafting the reports starts with 
input from the EU Delegations, which is compared 
with the assessment conducted in the headquarters 
of the EEAS. The EEAS’ ENP unit drafts these 
together with the geographical units. At the next 
stage, the EEAS seeks the input of the Commission 
Directorates General since the reports cover all the 
areas where the Commission has expertise. This 
is followed by the contributions, inter alia, from 
the Council of Europe, international financial 
institutions and civil society. The EEAS does not 
discuss or debate the content of the reports with the 
member states during the drafting process.
The regulatory issues are conducted in cooperation 
with the Commission Directorates General on the 
themes covering, among other things, transport, 
energy, environment, trade, and public health. For 
example, if the EEAS plans to work on transport 
within the neighborhood sphere, it needs to 
cooperate with the Directorate General for Mobility 
and Transport (DG MOVE). Likewise, the EEAS 
collaborates with the Directorate General for 
Energy taking into consideration both ‘pure’ energy 
issues and their implications for foreign policy. The 
EEAS also has to work with the Internal Market and 
Services Directorate General (DG MARKT), since 
some of the neighborhood countries are candidates 
to join the EU’s internal market. 
3The EEAS plays a central role in managing the 
ENPI funds channeled to the Eastern and Southern 
neighbors. The distribution of the ENPI funds 
between the two neighborhoods has followed a 
logical path. When the EU put forward the Eastern 
Partnership, the Eastern neighbors proportionally 
received more funding than the Southern partners. 
Following the Arab Spring, however, more funds 
have been allocated to the Southern neighbors. The 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is set 
to replace the ENPI in the upcoming multiannual 
financial framework. Besides the change in the name, 
there is also a modification among the beneficiaries. 
As opposed to the ENPI, the ENI will not cover 
Russia. 
The money that is allocated to the neighborhood 
is only a small portion of the multiannual financial 
framework which is the basis of the EU’s forthcoming 
seven-year spending cycle (2014-2020). The EEAS 
has asked for eighteen billion euro for the ENI. The 
requested sum is the opening bid, which means 
that at the end of the negotiating process the funds 
allocated will be less. The result is however expected 
to be more than what was earmarked for the ENP in 
the current multiannual financial framework. Even 
with this possible slight increase, the EEAS will not 
manage to change the ENP drastically.
Shifting the center of gravity
The creation of the EEAS and the recent 
developments in the EU’s neighborhoods brought 
a substantive change in the implementation of the 
ENP. Although the neighborhood policy was always 
supposed to be conditional, the conditionality was not 
implemented consistently. In its short existence, the 
EEAS made an effort to translate the conditionality 
from rhetoric to reality and communicate it more 
clearly to the partner states. The governments of the 
neighborhood countries are currently often reminded 
about the commitments that they made to their own 
citizens such as reforming the judiciary, fighting 
corruption, creating jobs and renewing their society 
at large.
The new approach adopted by the EEAS is based on 
merit. However, the ENP will only be credible when 
the double standards in assessing the progress of 
the neighborhood countries’ reforms (that threaten 
the ENP’s integrity) are eliminated. Otherwise the 
credibility of the ENP will be undermined. 
The EEAS and the member states
Although the EEAS initiates ideas and links up 
different strands of external policies, the member 
states hold the real decision-making powers. The 
latter however avoid voting on any issue at any level 
and prefer working through consensus building. 
Although theoretically even one member state can 
block the process, the veto power is rarely used. 
After all, in the Council structures, the member 
states meet regularly and the work is done in concert. 
Given the fact that institutional memory in the EU is 
very strong, member states try to avoid blocking the 
decision making process.
In the area of the ENP, the working relations 
between the member states and the EEAS are 
functioning well. The EEAS understands when 
the issue at hand falls within its own discretion. In 
cases, when the problem exceeds the boundaries of 
the EEAS’ discretionary power, the Service goes 
back to the member states. The primary fora for 
the interactions between the EEAS and the member 
states are the Council’s Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (COEST) and Mashreq/Maghreb (MaMa) 
working groups. One level up, the EEAS deals 
with the representatives of the member states in the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC). The member 
states conduct horizontal checks in the Comité des 
représentants permanents (COREPER) and their 
foreign ministers take the decisions in the Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC).1
For the EEAS, three elements determine the choice 
of the fora of the member states to address a given 
question: the magnitude of the issue; the divergence/
convergence of the positions of the member states on 
the item at hand; and strategic considerations. The 
general preference is to secure an agreement at a 
lower level when possible. If reaching an agreement 
is not feasible, then the EEAS moves the issues to the 
next higher level. The more sensitive or politicized 
the question is, it is likely to reach a higher level/
structure for debate and resolution. However, the 
EEAS might deviate from the aforementioned 
‘orthodox’ approach of decision making for strategic 
purposes. In specific cases related to important 
foreign policy issues, even if securing an agreement 
at the lower levels is possible, the EEAS might 
opt for a higher level in order to send an important 
signal to the neighborhood country concerned. 
If the question is discussed in the FAC and there 
4is a statement on behalf of the ministers, then it 
indicates that the issue is of greater importance 
to the EU. The EU’s reaction to the October 2012 
Ukrainian parliamentary elections is illustrative of 
the mechanism. The discussions on what should be 
the EU’s response in the immediate aftermath of the 
elections were first discussed at the level of COEST, 
then moved to the PSC and eventually ended up in 
the FAC of 10 December 2012 which issued a stern 
warning to Ukraine. 
Although the post-Lisbon period brought about a 
number of modifications in the EU’s external action 
institutions, it did not eliminate the divergences 
between the foreign policy interests and preferences 
of the member states. Among the member states, 
the patrons of the Eastern dimension of the 
neighborhood policy are, among others, Poland, 
Lithuania and Sweden. Regarding the Southern 
neighbors, the most active states are France, Spain 
and Italy. The rest of the member states, including 
those that have no interest in either neighborhoods, 
cluster around those two groupings. 
Operating within the context of the diverging 
preferences of the member states, the EEAS’ role 
is to find a balance and facilitate an understanding 
that there is one policy and one neighborhood. For 
the EU’s interests to be served, the EEAS needs to 
ensure that all the partner countries are granted 
equal chances to come closer to the EU rather than 
focusing on the ‘important’ neighbors favored by 
this or that member state. 
The diverging preferences of the member states 
cause conflicting philosophies concerning the aim 
of the EU’s neighborhood policy. On the one hand, 
some member states express loudly that the ENP is 
useless unless it delivers a membership perspective 
to those neighbors that meet the criteria mentioned 
in Art. 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
On the other hand, many member states view the 
ENP as a way of keeping the EU’s doors shut. 
Between these opposing views, there are member 
states that consider the neighborhood policy as a 
means for providing the tools to the governments 
of the partner states to reform. Also some member 
states simply do not take the neighborhood policy 
seriously. 
The EEAS navigates between a diversity of views 
and, for the purpose of feasibility, focuses on the 
center. Operationally, the Service builds coalitions 
around the member states and then in conjunction 
with them pushes the agenda forward. Once there 
is a critical mass of member states that supports 
a particular policy item, the EEAS puts it up for 
debate and discussion until a consensus is reached. 
The EEAS strategy will work better if the Service 
gains the trust of the member states and aims to 
find a compromise in the middle, leaning towards 
the side of the member states that want to do more. 
The cases in point are the EEAS leadership in the 
EU’s beefed up response to the Arab Spring and 
the initialing of the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine. Although there was a large consensus 
among the member states that the EU needs to do 
something as a reaction to the revolutions unfolding 
in the Arab world, the member states did not have 
a clear understanding what that something should 
be. The EEAS also managed to play a leading role 
in initialing the Association Agreement including 
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) with Ukraine in a context of uncertainty 
and divisions among the member states. 
The EEAS and the Commission
Although highly complex, the EEAS’ collaboration 
with the Commission in the area of the neighborhood 
policy largely functions well. As opposed to the 
other major policy areas that have specialized 
Directorates General in the Commission, there is no 
DG dealing exclusively with the neighborhood even 
though there is a Commissioner responsible for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, currently 
headed by Stefan Füle. The rest of the ‘ENP’ staff at 
the former Directorate General in charge of external 
relations (DG Relex) was moved on 1 January 
2011 to the EEAS. Instead, the Council decision 
establishing the EEAS instructs the Service to 
assist, inter alia, the Commissioner responsible 
for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy. The 
letter of the Council decision has been successfully 
implemented. The EEAS’ units dealing with the ENP 
became the de facto service of Commissioner Füle. 
Following the same logic, Füle in his role as 
neighborhood Commissioner works for the EEAS 
within the confines of the Commission. The HR/VP 
deals with the neighborhood issues mostly when a 
major crisis in erupts in one or more of the ENP 
countries. 
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constant contact with the Commission DGs 
including the DG for Energy, DG Home Affairs, 
DG Trade, and DG Development and Cooperation 
- EuropeAid (DEVCO). In cases when the EEAS’ 
and a particular Commission Directorate General’s 
preferences diverge in a specific sector, it makes 
it harder for the EEAS to secure the consent of 
the member states to act. For example, the EEAS 
might make its case in either the COEST or the 
MaMa working groups but it might be blocked 
by the member states in another forum where the 
Commission has successfully lobbied its case. 
Another complex area of cooperation is the 
mobility sector where the EEAS has to work with 
the Commission’s DG Home Affairs. The difficulty 
in relations arises from the fact that DG Home 
Affairs is much more in tune with the representatives 
of the interior ministries of the member states than 
with the EEAS. In the area of mobility, the EEAS 
seeks to do more than the Commission’s DG Home 
Affairs. The representatives of the member states in 
the MaMa working group, in particular, are also very 
much influenced by their national interior ministries 
and thus supportive of DG Home Affairs.
The Commission’s DG DEVCO collaborates with 
the EEAS on a daily basis facilitating yet another 
link between the Service and the Commission in 
the area of the ENP. The EEAS’ relations with DG 
DEVCO have been improving after initial problems. 
In the post-Lisbon system, the EEAS takes the 
lead on programming the country allocations in 
the multiannual financial framework, country and 
regional strategic papers as well as national and 
regional indicative programs. DG DEVCO leads 
the programming of the annual actions and their 
implementation. The EEAS and DG DEVCO 
coordinate the ENPI funds together (the EEAS does 
the programming and DG DEVCO is responsible 
for the implementation). The debates are primarily 
about how much money has to be allocated to which 
region or country. Therefore, the EEAS and the 
Commission’s DG DEVCO check and balance each 
other with neither side being able to overrule the 
other. 
Conversely, when the EEAS and the Commission 
converge on an issue, the EEAS’ argument is 
perceived by the member states as being strong. 
For instance, the EEAS is a natural ally of the 
Commission’s DG Trade since both seek to open up 
the EU’s markets. In contrast, many member states 
are protectionist in their trade policies. The case of 
opening up the DCFTA negotiations with the smaller 
eastern neighbors is illustrative. Initially, DG Trade 
perceived the Eastern partners as unprepared to 
reform as well as non-significant for the EU’s trade 
as such and resisted starting negotiations with them. 
The EEAS however swayed DG Trade to agree on 
opening the negotiations since as opposed to the 
DCFTA’s insignificance for the EU’s trade purposes, 
the process was viewed as important for its foreign 
policy. After a number of consultations between the 
EEAS and DG Trade, the latter presented an early 
draft text for the start of negotiations, which could 
not have been acceptable for the partner countries. 
Once the EEAS and DG Trade came to an agreement, 
DG Trade received the mandate from the member 
states to open the negotiations as it did with Georgia 
and Moldova in December 2011.  
More problems ahead? 
Currently more than one third of the EEAS’ staff 
originates from the Commission ensuring smooth 
working relations between the Service and the 
Commission. This is set to change over the long-term. 
Many national diplomats that are already transferred 
to the EEAS and whose number is expected to 
reach 1/3rd of the EEAS’ total staff often need to 
improve their knowledge of how to work with the 
Commission. The EEAS is likely to become more 
independent from other EU institutions over time 
and the gap between the EEAS and the Commission 
is expected to widen. 
In order ensure the sustainability of the relations 
between the EEAS and the Commission, the staff 
rotation across the institutions has to be made much 
easier. The EU’s leadership should stimulate a 
change of environment in a way that moving from 
the Commission to the EEAS or vice versa is not 
viewed negatively. Moreover, before joining the 
EEAS, the representatives of the member states, 
especially those who are planning to work on the 
neighborhood issues, should be encouraged to get 
acquainted with the workings of the Commission.  
The EEAS and the European Parliament
The European Parliament is a natural ally of the 
EEAS in the area of the ENP. Philosophically, the 
Parliament belongs to the group of EU actors that 
6push the Union to do more in the neighborhoods. 
This approach is certainly beneficial to the EEAS. 
Many members of the European Parliament call 
for the ENP to cover much more than what the 
policy currently encompasses, including offering 
a membership perspective to the Eastern partners. 
Presently, the Parliament does not have the 
competence to offer a membership perspective to 
any neighborhood country. However, within the 
EU institutions, the Parliament is unsurpassable in 
its ability to hold public debates and thus build a 
consensus around an issue.
Although the European Parliament has tried 
to push the EEAS and/or the Commission to do 
more in the area of regulatory approximation, its 
involvement in the technical aspects of the day to 
day implementation of the regulatory affairs has 
remained rather limited. For example, while some 
members of the European Parliament argued in 
favor of an open air agreement with the Southern 
partners with the concurrence of both the EEAS 
and the Commission’s DG MOVE, this trilateral 
coalition failed in the face of strong opposition by 
some member states.  
The European Parliament also supported the 
EEAS in the area of funding for the ENP. The 
Parliament is a co-decider on the external action 
expenditure including on the budget allocated 
to the neighborhood policy. The majority of the 
members of the European Parliament have shown 
consistency in advocating for more funds for the 
neighborhood. When the Parliament prepares its 
draft ENP expenditure, which surpasses what the 
EEAS requested, it naturally supports the latter’s 
cause. 
Conclusion
In order to advance the EU’s interests in the 
neighborhoods, the EEAS has to work with other 
EU actors. The Service operates in an environment 
of diverging interests between the member states 
and therefore has a careful balancing act to perform. 
The EEAS’ major challenge in this area is to counter 
some tendencies by the member states to sponsor 
particular neighboring countries for their national 
strategic prerogatives. In this context, together with 
the Commission and the European Parliament, the 
EEAS has to communicate clearly that the ENP aims 
to provide equal opportunities for all partner countries. 
The absence of a Commission Directorate General 
for Neighbourhood Policy and the existence of a 
large number of EEAS staff originating from the 
Commission facilitate stable working relations 
between the EEAS and the Commission in the area 
of neighborhood policy. The tensions with some of 
the Commissions DGs on specific sectoral issues 
however remain a challenge for the EEAS, partly 
because of the lack of capabilities in the EEAS on 
these issues. In a long-term perspective, with the 
induction of a greater number of diplomats from 
the member states in the EEAS, the Service is 
likely to become more independent from the other 
institutions, thereby leading to heightened tensions 
between it and some of the Commission DGs. 
The European Parliament has limited formal 
competences in the areas of the ENP. However, 
the pressure that the members of the Parliament as 
the representatives of the Union’s citizens put on 
the member states through highlighting the issues 
in public debates and utilizing the Parliament’s 
competence in the external action expenditure helps 
the work of the EEAS.
In sum, the EU institutions and the member states 
have spent seven years trying to identify what the 
Union is capable of offering to the partner countries, 
which although short of a membership perspective, 
often projected unrealistic expectations from the 
neighborhood policy. The EEAS has left its mark 
on the ENP by communicating more clearly what 
the EU can offer and what the deliverables of the 
partner countries are at this point in time. Ultimately, 
the EEAS’ service to the EU’s interests, although 
limited by the preferences of the member states 
and their decision-making rights as well as the 
Commission’s competences, should be influencing 
the countries of both neighborhoods to do their 
homework and implement real reforms at last.
Endnotes
1 With the exception of the COREPER, the EEAS’ 
representatives chair and set the agenda at all 
aforementioned mentioned levels.
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